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COMMENT
Environmental Audits: An Analysis of the Dilemma and
an Assessment of Oklahoma's Response
I. Introduction
Over the last several years, both regulators and the parties they monitor have come
to realize the tremendous value of environmental auditing as a means of ensuring the
maintenance of regulated entities' compliance with federal and state environmental
laws. This increase in the popularity of environmental auditing has given rise to
complex statutes and administrative rules designed to provide incentives for
performance and disclosure of environmental audits. As a result, a heated debate has
ensued between regulated entities, the states, and the agencies within the federal
government charged with the task of protecting the environment. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has taken a strong stand against the adoption and
maintenance of state statutes that provide evidentiary privileges and immunity from
administrative and civil enforcement actions based on the results of environmental
audits. The EPA fears that the protections offered by some of these laws may frustrate
regulatory efforts at protecting the environment.
State regulators face a dilemma in deciding what protections to offer in order to
provide incentives to encourage the performance of environmental audits. The problem
lies in the fact that the protections offered in audit incentive policies may frustrate the
purposes of the environmental regulations which state agencies are charged with
enforcing. Viewing the advantages and disadvantages of the federal and various types
of state environmental audit protection laws and administrative rules, it is possible to
decide what types of protections for environmental audits are sufficient to accomplish
the goals of environmental protection without sacrificing economic progress along the
way.
A. Background on EnvironmentalRegulation
Before the 1980s, the field of environmental protection was dominated by the
"command-and-control" philosophy of regulation.' Federal and state environmental
authorities protected this country's natural resources under the confines of a rigorous
system of intricate environmental laws and regulations designed to mandate methods
of compliance and identify and prosecute all violators.2 Beginning with the Reagan
administration, however, such a labor-intensive and economically burdensome system

1. See E. Lynn Grayson & Christina M. Riewer, EPA'sAudit Policy and State Audit PrivilegeLaws:
Moving Beyond Command and Control?,27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,243 (May 1997).
2. See id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:541

of enforcement became highly unattractive in an era of regulatory downsizing.3 As
one author put it, 'Ronald Reagan and his advisors believed the president had been
elected to bring 'regulatory relief to the American economy, and environmental
'4
regulations were an early priority on the 'hit list' of laws needing 'regulatory reform. '
Since that time, the government has begun to shy away from such resourceintensive methods of environmental enforcement. In an article on environmental
audits, one commentator describes the problems that the EPA faces regarding its
regulatory budget and the road blocks to environmental enforcement currently plaguing
the EPA! In 1996, following a series of budget cutbacks, Carol Browner, head of the
EPA, made the announcement that government agencies no longer had the resources
to carry the environmental regulatory burden alone.6 Browner stated that "[t]he
environmental cop is absolutely not on the beat.... We cannot ensure American
people their air is clean, their drinking water is safe, [or] the health of their children
is protected."7 One way to close the regulatory gap in enforcement created by these
budget cuts is to encourage industries to self-police their environmental compliance!
B. Dawn of the Environmental Audit
The EPA has called for a change in the means by which it enforces its regulations
through an increase in voluntary assistance and a decrease in federal and state
monitoring.' This request for help from regulated entities has not, however, altered
the substance of t-e environmental statutes the government seeks to enforce. The
Federal Register is inundated with a myriad of intricate and complicated laws" which
impose strict requirements on a number of industries." While the EPA's enforcement
resources have been diminished by budget cutbacks, 2 regulated entities are still
expected to comply with environmental laws. In fact, most environmental laws call
for voluntary monitoring and documentation of compliance. 3
Whether a state statute requires voluntary monitoring or not, regulatory agencies
still exist at all levels of government with the power to inspect potential violations
and enforce the law against any wrongdoers. 4 Environmental regulations are still
3. See id.
4. WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 4 (2d ed. 1991).
5. See Anna Kathryne Campbell, The EnvironmentalAuditPrivilege: Where Does Louisiana Stand
in the Federalv. State Showdown?, 57 LA. L. REv. 1029, 1031 (1997).
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See IncentivesjbrSelf-Policing:Discovery, Disclosure, CorrectionandPreventionof Violations,
60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,706-07 (1995).
10. See John Davidson, Privilegesfor Environmental Audits: Is Mum Really the Word?, 4 S.C.
ENvTL. LJ. 111, 111-12 (1995).
11. See id.
12. See Campbell, 5upranote 5, at 1031 (stating that spending cuts have resulted in a 40% decrease
in EPA inspections since 1995).
13. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1994) (outlining the monitoring requirements for the Clean Air
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6934 (1994) (discussing the reporting and monitoring requirements of the Toxic
Substances Control Act).
14. See Michael T Scanlon, A State Statutory Privilegefor Environmental Audits: Is It a Suit of
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being enforced despite cutbacks in agency inspections. Thus, regulated entities
have a heightened need to stay on top of their compliance efforts. Though industry
has largely been left to monitor its own compliance without the prodding of
frequent agency evaluations, the failure of corporations and individuals to meet
agency standards has the same result that it did in the days when agency enforcement activity was more intense. 5 Severe civil and criminal penalties 6may be
imposed as a result of failing to abide by federal environmental statutes.'
1. Definition and Description of an Environmental Audit
One way that regulated entities have responded to the need for increased efforts
in the voluntary monitoring of compliance is through the use of environmental
audits. The EPA defines an environmental audit as "a systematic, documented,
periodic and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and
practices related to meeting environmental requirements."' 7 An audit has been
defined as an investigative procedure used by a regulated entity to gauge its own
compliance with environmental standards."5 The results of the investigation are
reported to management authorities within the company, along with any recommendations for remedial actions available to achieve compliance where neces9
sary.1
An environmental audit can be tailored to achieve a variety of objectives,
including "verify[ing] compliance with environmental requirements; evaluat[ion of]
the effectiveness of environmental management systems already in place; or
assess[ment of the] risks from regulated and unregulated materials and practices."' Thus, an environmental audit can be general or specific, depending on
the requirements and the nature of the regulated activity. In order to assist
companies and individuals in the creation and employment of effective environmental auditing programs, the EPA has outlined several factors which it considers
essential to the auditing process. Those factors include high level management
support for environmental auditing and adequate staffing and procedures for the
performance and reporting of audits.'
2. Advantages of Auditing
The implementation of a thorough audit policy is a valuable and efficient means

Armor or Just the Emperor's New Clothes?, 29 IND. L. REV. 647, 647 (1996).
15. See id.
16. See id.

17. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25004, 25006 (1986).
18. See David A. Chaumette & William W. Cason, Auditing Environmental Audit Policies: Has
Industry Been Hoisted on Its Own Petard?,4 Wis. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997).
19. See id.

20. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 25006.
21. See id. at 25009 (discussing the basic elements of an environmental audit program: executive
support for audit programs with a promise to act upon audit findings; auditing procedure independent
of audited activities; adequate staffing and auditor training; specific audit program goals, scope, resources
and frequency; efficient means for gathering and preparing audit findings, remedial recommendations and
schedules for implementation; and a process to ensure the quality and accuracy of audit results).
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for maintaining compliance with environmental standards for both regulators and
the regulated.' Voluntary auditing and disclosure enable regulatory agencies to
learn about potential environmental problems to which they may not have
otherwise been privy because of a lack of adequate investigatory resources.'
From the standpoint of a regulated company, environmental auditing ensures that
when an agency investigation does occur, a regulated entity will not be caught by
surprise.2 A company which employs auditing procedures will be aware of most
or all of its potential violations and will be able to show regulators that measures
have been taken to identify and rectify any problems. Further, environmental
auditing allows regulated entities to discover problems in their infancy so that a
violation can be mitigated before it becomes unmanageable.
3. Disadvantages of Auditing
Voluntary auditing conserves federal resources by allowing regulated entities to
police themselves. Because of their soothing effect on the swelling of environmental regulatory costs, the EPA has expressly encouraged the voluntary performance
of environmental audits by regulated entities.' The EPA has not made the
absolute promise, however, that the results of voluntary audit reports will not be
used to impose civil and criminal liabilities against companies who heed the
government's call to cooperate. As the old saying goes, "no good deed goes
unpunished." For example, Coors Brewing Company's voluntary disclosure of
environmental violations resulted in penalties in excess of a million dollars. The
Coors example -clearly illustrates the potential liability regulated entities face in
disclosing environmental audits.' Thus, regulated entities are hesitant to perform
and submit environmental audits for fear that they may subject themselves to
liabilities which they may have otherwise avoided. In addition, companies also
worry that the disclosure of audit reports may reveal trade secrets.27
4. Background to the Auditing Dilemma
Regulated entities have sought to protect the information .contained in audit
reports through certain legal doctrines, including the attorney-client privilege, the
attorney work product doctrine and the self-evaluative privilege. However, these
legal doctrines employed to protect the information contained in audit reports are
not without their shortcomings. As a result, regulated entities have requested that
the government provide some sort of protection for their cooperation in environmental regulation. Specifically, companies want the government to guarantee relief

22. See William N. Farran, III & Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Environmental Regulatory Objective:
Auditing and Compliance or Crime and Punishment,21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,239, 10,240
(May 1991).
23. See id.
24. See Michael 11. Levin et al., Discovery and Disclosure: How To Protect Your Environmental
Audit Report, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1606 (Jan. 7, 1994).
25. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 17, at 25004.
26. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1031-32.
27. See Farran & Adams, supra note 22, at 10,245.
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from penalties. Furthermore, companies do not want the results of audits used by
the EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) as a basis for agency enforcement
actions or disclosed to third parties who may use the reports as evidence in civil
suits. Thus, the main issues with regard to the future of environmental auditing are
whether audit reports should be privileged and whether a company that volunteers
audit information should be exempt from civil and criminal liability for violations
reported through an environmental audit.'
In response to these questions and the rolling wave of state audit protection
laws, the EPA formulated a final policy statement on environmental auditing in
1995." Unfortunately, many interested parties feel that the EPA's answer to their
regulatory questions is incomplete at best since it fails to guarantee the application
of the protections it offers." Before and after the adoption of the policy,
industries petitioned state governments to pick up where the federal government
left off by providing further protections for the disclosure of environmental audit
reports. Nineteen states have enacted audit privilege and immunity laws and others
are sure to follow." Oklahoma, however, has adopted a state agency regulation
2
concerning environmental audit privileges, instead of a state statute. This
comment will attempt to evaluate the adequacy of Oklahoma's environmental audit
incentives policy as compared to the federal policy, similar state laws, and the
factors opposing and favoring privileges and immunities for environmental audits.
H. Shortcomings of Legal and Other Nonstatutory Protections
Before industry's cry for statutory protections for environmental audits, several
traditional legal doctrines such as the attorney-client privilege, the work product
doctrine, and the self-evaluative privilege were employed in an attempt to shield
companies from the imposition of criminal and civil liability based on the results
of audit reports. These nonstatutory protections are, however, subject to certain
limitations which may leave the contents of an audit report open to discovery. This
presents a serious problem because, when performed correctly, an audit exposes
the auditing party to the possibility of litigation, because it identifies the
ingredients of a violation in detailed fashion. 3

28. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1030.
29. See Incentivesfor Self-Policing: DLscovery, Disclosure, Correction& Preventionof Violations,

60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) [hereinafter EPA's Final Policy Statement].
30. See id. at 66,712 (stating that the policy is not a final agency action and thus does not create
any rights, duties, or obligations).
31. See Campbell, supranote 5, at 1030 n.6 (listing states which have enacted audit privilege laws
and the various types of privileges they offer).
32. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7 (1997) (outlining factors for self-reporting of
noncompliance).
33. See John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluation Privilege & Corporate Compliance Audits, 68

S. CAL. L. REv. 621, 628 (1995) (stating that "since a good legal audit essentially provides a 'road map'
to corporate wrongs, it can be very useful to parties opposing the corporation").
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A. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Environmental Auditing
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest and most well-recognized traditional
legal doctrine used to protect confidential information.' The privilege has been
successfully employed in the context of environmental audits as a means of
protecting the confidentiality of the information gathered." The privilege prohibits
the disclosure of any information revealed to an attorney by his client for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice.' The basic elements of the attorney-client
privilege are: (1) the client must seek legal advice from a lawyer who is acting in
a professional capacity; (2) the information revealed by the client must have been
disclosed for the purpose of receiving legal advice; (3) the confidentiality of the
information must not have been jeopardized by either the client or the attorney;
and (4) the privilege must not have been waived by disclosure to third parties or
by any other means. 7
Regulated entities often hire attorneys to conduct or assist in the performance
of environmental audits, hoping that the information gathered will enjoy privileged
status. As the elements outlined above suggest, the privilege is subject to
limitations that may render it inapplicable in the case of environmental audits. For
instance, the privilege will not protect purely factual information."
The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not
to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact
is an entirely different thing .... The client ... may not refuse to
disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he
incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his
attorney."
Thus, any factual information contained in an audit may be accessed by the
government through its own inquiries, as factual material is not privileged. In
addition, the privilege will not apply in cases where a waiver has occurred."
Further, in most instances, an attorney does not act as the sole auditor. Rather, an
attorney merely assists in the preparation of the audit report itself.4' Specifically,
in such a situation the attorney communicates with several persons in gathering the
information for the report, who may or may not be employees of the corporation.
34. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387 (1981). But see, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
35. See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 7-8 (citing Olen Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl, Inc.,
24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Enitl. L. Inst.) 20936 (C.D. Cal., April 12, 1994) (holding that the attorney client
privilege could apply to an environmental audit where the information relayed in the audit was
communicated to the altorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice)).
36. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
37. See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 8.
38. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97 (stating that a party cannot conceal a fact merely by revealing
it to his attorney).
39. Id. at 395-96.
40. See IBM v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
41. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1033.
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Thus, without addressing the implications of agency principles, the confidentiality
of the information may be waived. Finally, the purpose of the communications
between the attorney and the client must have been to obtain legal advice.42 Most
audits are prepared for the purpose of creating a report, as required by statute,43
which will be submitted to regulators for the purpose of monitoring compliance.
An audit is often conducted solely to comply with applicable environmental laws
and not to obtain legal advice. Only in cases in which the company can establish
that the primary purpose for the audit was to obtain legal advice will the court
allow the privilege to stand."
Further, some courts have held that the attorney's involvement in the audit
process must meet a certain threshold level. In United States v. Chevron,45 the
court held that an attorney's role in an environmental audit must be more than
mere presence during the process." The court held that the lawyer must be acting
in his capacity as an attorney and must be performing a legal inquiry or like
services which constitute more than simple fact-finding.47 Under these standards,
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the results of environmental
audit reports is significantly constrained. For audit reports to qualify under the
privilege, the role of counsel must be cautiously constructed, both in terms of the
content of the audit report and the reasons for its creation. As a result of these
limitations, the apprehension felt by regulated entities in the creation of audit
reports, even those helped by an attorney, is easy to understand.
B. The Work ProductDoctrine and Environmental Auditing
The work product doctrine is a valuable safeguard for environmental audits,
affording wider protections than those extended by the attorney-client privilege.48
As outlined in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4" the work
product doctrine shields an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
and theories established in anticipation of litigation from disclosure." The work
product doctrine applies to materials and communications exchanged within the
attorney-client relationship5 as well as to information gathered by agents assisting
the attorney, provided such materials were amassed in anticipation of litigation. 2

42. See id.
43. See, e.g., supra note 13 (examples of environmental protection statutes that require monitoring
reports by regulated entities).
44. See IBM Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Del. 1968) (outlining the
requirements for the attorney-client privilege).
45. Civ. A. No. 88-6681, 1989 W.L. 121616 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 16, 1989).
46. See id. at *6.

47. See id.
48. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH SELECTED STATUTES
64-65 (1996).
50. See id.

51. See id.
52. See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 10.
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Despite the differences in the protections afforded, the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine are similar in that both are subject to limitations
which may render them inapplicable in the case of environmental audits. For
example, courts recognize a distinction between factual work product and "opinion
work product."' In addition, under the work product doctrine, information
designated as privileged must have been prepared in anticipation of litigation.
While the privilege is not restricted to pending lawsuits', the privilege only
protects materials prepared, at a minimum, with "an eye toward litigation."5
Further, the possibility of litigation must be "distinct."' Thus, in the case of
environmental audits, the work product doctrine is limited to particular circumstances. For companies that prepare audits as a part of their everyday business
operations and that are not constantly in the shadow of pending litigation, the work
product doctrine may not apply.' In addition, an exception to the privilege may
further limit its application. If an opposing party can establish a "substantial need"
for the information in question, or can prove that the opposition will be subject to
"undue hardship" because of nondisclosure, a court may waive the privilege. 8
One final limitation on the application of the work product doctrine, which is
especially pertinent to environmental audit reports, is the issue of confidentiality.
The privilege requires the preservation of the confidentiality of the information
contained in the audit 9 Because many companies voluntarily reveal the results
of environmental audits to the government in order to remain in compliance with
certain environmental monitoring requirements, the purposes of environmental
audits are potentially inconsistent with the requirement of confidentiality inherent
in the work product doctrine.' Unfortunately, no case law has dealt with the
clash between the work product doctrine and the voluntary disclosure of audit
materials to the EPA. In the realm of securities law, however, case law holds that
voluntary disclosure of confidential materials to a governmental agency that
occupies an adversarial position toward the disclosing entity leaves no reasonable
expectation of confidentiality of the disclosed information." Thus, much like the
-

53. See Conway, supra note 33, at 633.
54. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1034.
55. In re Sealed Care, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
56. See Taroli v. General Electric Co., 114 F.R.D. 97, 99 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding the work
product doctrine inapplicable because the defendant was unable to establish that a lawsuit was a distinct
possibility at the time ths information in question was gathered).
57. See United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stating that the work product
doctrine does not shield information gathered in the ordinary course of business).

58. See Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the circumstances that result in a waiver of the privilege provided by the work product
doctrine).

59. See In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation, 860 F.2d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the privilege provided by the work product doctrine is waived when the information in
question is not kept confidential).

60. See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 12.
61. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a
voluntary disclosure of information to the SEC waived any privilege provided by the work product
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attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine may be an unreliable source of
protection for environmental audits.
C. The Self-Evaluative Privilege and Environmental Auditing
The self-evaluative privilege operates as a discovery shield for certain voluntary
assessments that could conceivably be used in future litigation against the auditing
party. 2 The self-evaluative privilege recognizes the notion that investigations such
as environmental audits have significant value in maintaining public health, safety,
and welfare.' In order to encourage companies to continue to engage in such
investigations, the self-evaluative privilege seeks to promote open and voluntary
self-evaluations by protecting the information gathered in inquiries such as
environmental audits.' One of the most significant benefits of the self-evaluative
privilege is that it does not require that an attorney prepare the materials sought
to be protected.' The elements of the privilege are: (1) the material in question
must have been gathered in the process of a self-evaluation; (2) a significant public
interest must exist demanding the open exchange of the type of information sought;
and (3) requiring the disclosure of such information would chill the incentive to
perform self-evaluations.' The self-evaluative privilege is very similar to Rule
407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provide, in part, that "an entity's
retrospective self-assessment of its compliance with [environmental] regulations
should be privileged in appropriate cases."'6
Unfortunately, the self-evaluative privilege has limited application to environmental audits. Few, if any, courts have applied the doctrine at all in the case of
environmental audits.' Only one court to date has allowed the application of the
self-evaluative privilege to protect the results of an environmental audit.' Even
in those cases in which the privilege is allowed, a showing of unique circumstances or special need may overcome the privilege." Therefore, regulated entities are

doctrine).
62. See
667, 674-75
63. See
64. See
65. See
66. See

Joseph E. Murphy & Illise L. Feitshans, Protectingthe Compliance Audit, 943 PLI/CORP.
(1996).
Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 13.
id. at 13-14.
id. at 17.
Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D 249, 250-51 (D. D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920

(D.C. Cir. 1973).
67. Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
68. See Paula C. Murray, The EnvironmentalSelf Audit Privilege:Growing Movement in the States
Nixed By EPA, 24 REAL EST. L. 169, 172 (1995) (stating that the self-evaluative privilege has been
applied in other fields such as medical audits, but not environmental); see also, e.g., United States v.
Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that public policy considerations regarding
uninhibited enforcement of the Clean Water Act override any interests in nondisclosure).
69. See Reichhold Chem., 157 F.R.D. at 527 (holding that the privilege should apply to
environmental audits in appropriate circumstances because the public interest in environmental
compliance is significantly furthered when regulated entities feel they can engage in open self-evaluation
without having to worry about having their efforts turned against them in a lawsuit some time in the

future).
70. See id. at 526.
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not able to rely confidently on the self-evaluative privilege to shield them from
liability for administrative penalties or criminal and civil suits.
Il.EPA's Final Policy Statement Regarding EnvironmentalAudits
As a result of the practical limitations inherent in nonstatutory privilege
doctrines, regulated entities began to exert more pressure on the states and the
federal government to provide some sort of statutory protections for environmental
audits. The EPA attempted to heed the call of regulated entities for more
protections by issuing its final policy statement dealing with "Incentives for SelfPolicing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention."'" Besides attempting
to satisfy regulated entities, the EPA issued this policy statement to avoid the
passage of more state privilege and immunity statutes than those already in
existence. Unfortunately, the federal government's response may not provide
regulated entities with the protection they seek in order to encourage disclosure of
audit reports.
The final policy statement clearly discourages state audit privilege and immunity
laws for several reasons.' First, the EPA argues that state audit protection
statutes, especially those which offer a qualified privilege, only help violators
avoid compliance by helping them to cover their tracks." "A privilege would
invite defendants to claim as 'audit' material almost any evidence the government
needed to establish a violation .. . ,,.Second, the EPA asserts that such laws
are contrary to open environmental policy and decision making. "Privilege, by
definition, invites secrecy instead of the openness needed to build public trust in
industry's ability to self-police."" Third, the EPA argues that audit privilege laws
would only serve to increase litigation costs by inundating courts with lawsuits
designed to test the limits of such privileges.76 Consequently, in states in which
audit privilege and immunity statutes have been enacted despite regulatory
frowning, the EPA has reserved the right to "take necessary actions" to protect the
environment from violations hidden by the privileges afforded under state laws that
contradict the federal policy.' Those necessary actions most likely would include
increased enforcement in those states offering such privileges and preemption of
state laws which frustrate the purposes of federal environmental regulations.
A. Incentives to Audit
As an alternative to regulation by negative reinforcement, the EPA's final policy
statement offers several positive protections in an effort to encourage voluntary
policing, disclosure, and remediation of environmental violations. Generally, those

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
See id. at 66,710.
See id.
Id. at 66,710.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 66,712.
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protections include the reduction of gravity-based punitive penalties, a refrain from
criminal referrals, and desistance from routine requests for environmental audit
reports, even in situations in which compliance is required by statute and enforced
through penalties. The EPA views these protections as sufficient to encourage
environmental auditing for regulated entities that are hesitant to audit.7
The foundation of the EPA's incentive policy is the reduction of gravity-based
penalties in exchange for the prompt exposure and remediation of violations of
environmental regulations.' The EPA penalties have two components: (1) a
gravity-based component, and (2) an additional fine to compensate for any
economic gain realized as a result of noncompliance.' A gravity-based penalty
is one that fines the violator based on the seriousness of its conduct."1 In its
policy, the EPA has offered to waive completely all gravity-based penalties where
the violation in question was uncovered during a voluntary audit that meets the
EPA's requirement of "due diligence."' If discovery is not made during an audit
and evidence of "due diligence" cannot be found, the EPA has offered to reduce
the amount of gravity-based penalties by 75% if a violation is voluntarily
uncovered, exposed, and remediatedY However, this offer does not limit the
EPA's ability to penalize a regulated entity for any economic gains which may
have been obtained as a result of noncompliance.' The EPA still reserves the
right to levy fines in the amount of any profits that may have been earned as a
result of noncompliance."
In addition to the reduction of penalties, the EPA offers to refrain from referring
a regulated entity for prosecution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) if certain
conditions are met.' There are nine general requirements for application of the
policy87 and a few additional prerequisites that are specific to the offer to refrain
from criminal referrals. 8 In addition to the nine general requirements of the
policy, the violation disclosed must not evidence a prevalent management policy
that conceals or condones violations or involve assistance of high level
management either consciously or deliberately ignoring a violation.
The final incentive offered in the policy involves requests for audit reports. The
EPA states that in exchange for cooperation with the audit policy, it will refrain
from requesting an audit report, which could serve as a basis for an enforcement

78. See id. at 66,706, 66,711.
79. See id. at 66,706-07.
80. See id. at 66,711.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 66,707. In defining "due diligence," the EPA outlines the elements for this standard in
detailed, lengthy fashion at 60 Fed. Reg. 66,710-11.
83. See id. at 66,707.
84. See id.
85. See infra Part III.B.I.
86. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.
87. See discussion infra Part III.B.
88. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66-711.
89. See id.
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action.' This component of the final policy on audits offers the assurance that the
EPA will not require a regulated entity to conduct an audit that will then be used
as a basis to prove violation. However, much like the other provisions of the
policy, the EPA reserves its right to bypass the protections offered. For instance,
in cases in which the EPA has information from an independent source suggesting
that a violation has occurred, the EPA reserves discretion to request disclosure of
an audit report in order to facilitate investigation of the alleged infraction."
B. Requirements for the Application of the Final Policy
In order for a regulated entity disclosing a violation to be eligible for any of the
protections offered in the final policy statement, nine conditions must first be
met.' Provided that an entity complies with these requirements, the EPA has the
discretion to offer the application of the final policy statement to the regulated
party.9'
1. Discovery Through Audit
The violation reported must be discovered through an environmental audit or a
-related procedure that reflects certain qualities that will ensure the accuracy of the
report.' The report must be the result of a systematic, objective process which is
well documented and which evidences the regulated entity's "due diligence" in
avoiding, revealing, and remedying any violations."3 Failure to meet this first
condition will not necessarily result in the loss of all benefits offered under the
policy.' A 75% reduction in gravity-based penalties is still available if this first
condition is not met, provided that the regulated entity is in compliance with the
remaining eight requirements. 7
2. Noncompulsor Discovery
The violation reported must be discovered voluntarily as opposed to being
uncovered under a statutorily-mandated monitoring requirement." The benefits
offered under the final policy statement are not applicable in situations in which
sampling is required by law." The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is an
example of a typical federal environmental regulation that requires regular
monitoring and reporting.W Thus, where the TSCA requires a regulated entity

90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 66,708.
See id.
See id. at 66,711-12.
See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 26.

94. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.

95.
96.
97.
98.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

99. See id. at 66,708.
100. See supranote 13 (providing the statutory citation for the monitoring requirements ofthe Toxic

Substances Control Act).
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to monitor and report compliance with the statute, the incentives offered in the
final policy statement are not applicable because the regulated entity's actions were
not voluntary.
3. Timely Disclosure
The violation in question must be reported in writing within ten days, or less if
required by statute."' The preamble of the final policy statement provides an
exception in cases in which the violation in question involves complicated
biological reactions in which a problem does not become readily apparent within
the ten-day period.0 2 The EPA may accept the delayed report of such a violation,
provided the problem does not present an imminent threat to public health and
safety." 3 Acceptance of reports after the prescribed period is left to the discretion
of the EPA.'"
4. Unsolicited Discovery
The violation in question must be reported before the initiation of an agency
inspection, civil suit, the filing of a complaint by a third party, the reporting of the
violation by a whistle blower, or the impending discovery of the violation by a
regulatory agency. 5 A report is hardly voluntary when the incentive to perform
and disclose an audit was provided by notice of a lawsuit or a call from the EPA
telling a regulated entity that inspectors are on the way. Nevertheless, the final
policy statement does not address the question of whether the benefits are available
to a company that performs an audit while unaware of an imminent lawsuit or
enforcement action.?0
5. Timely Remediation
The violation reported must be remedied within a period of sixty days. Furthermore, the regulated entity must correct any environmental or human health hazards
which directly or indirectly result from the problem disclosed. Any remedial
measures taken must be certified and disclosed in writing.0 7
The EPA reserves the right to determine what measures are appropriate for the
remediation of any subsequent problems. Further, the EPA does not guarantee the
confidentiality of any of the corrective measures it imposes. The EPA also
reserves the right to require that agreements are reached with the public to induce
prompt and effective remediation. If a regulated entity anticipates that corrective
actions will require more than sixty days, the EPA mandates that notice of such
delay be expressed in writing before the sixty-day period ends."'

101. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.

102. See id. at 66,708.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 27.
60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.
Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 28.
60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.

108. See id.
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6. Antecedent Measures To Prevent Recurrence
The reporting entity must guarantee in writing that steps will be taken to ensure
that the problem disclosed will not arise again." One of the canons of environmental protection is the promotion of antecedent versus consequent remediation.
The EPA wants to encourage regulated entities to fix problems before rather than
after they occur. One reason underlying this philosophy of regulation is that
damage to the environment is hardly ever completely remedied.
7. Disqualificationfor Recurring Problems
In order to enforce the provisions of the previous requirement, the EPA will
refuse to extend the benefits offered in the final policy statement to any reporting
regulated entity that demonstrates a past failure to enact preventative measures.
Specifically, the violation reported must not be the same as or substantially similar
to a problem that has occurred at the same facility within three years of the current
disclosure. Further, the problem disclosed cannot be one that evidences a pattern
of violations by the controlling organization of the facility in question within five
years prior to the current reporting. A documented violation of any applicable
environmental law or agency rule will be considered." '
8. Exceptional Violations
The violation reported cannot result in substantial actual damage or pose an
imminent and significant threat to human or environmental health. Further, the
problem disclosed cannot be a violation of the express terms of a court or agency
order or consent agreement."' The final policy statement fails to define the terms
that determine the severity of the violation reported. Specifically, it is unclear how
the EPA defines the terms "substantial, significant or imminent harm...". The
impact of this ambiguity is that the failure to define these terms leaves the EPA
with considerable discretion in determining whether the damage caused by a
violation is so severe that exemption from the policy is warranted.
9. Guarantee of Assistance
If the reporting entity promises to cooperate with the EPA, then the final policy
statement may apply."' The regulated entity must agree to afford investigators
access to any relevant information, documents, and persons needed to expedite an
inquiry into a reported violation or any related matters of noncompliance."" This
final requirement allows the EPA to investigate matters not disclosed in an audit
report where deemed necessary." 5

109. See id.
110. See id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. at 66,712.
Chaumette & Cison, supra note 18, at 30.
See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,712.
See id.
See id. at 66,70Y)-10.
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C. Shortcomings Of The EPA's Final Policy Statement
While some interested parties view the EPA's final policy statement as a step
forward, many regulated entities have voiced the opinion that the policy leaves
much to be desired. For instance, the EPA reserves broad discretion essentially to
ignore the entire policy. After all, the final policy statement is nothing more than
a guidance tool. The EPA expressly acknowledges this fact within the policy. "The
policy is not a final agency action and is intended as guidance. It does not create
any rights, duties, obligations, or defenses, implied or otherwise, in any third parties.." 6 Thus, the EPA may consider the factors listed in the policy in order to
mitigate any punishment, but it provides no true guarantees. Further, regulated
entities cannot rely on the final policy statement to protect the confidentiality of
the audit reports submitted."7 Finally, the benefits offered in the policy do not
apply when penalty reductions have been afforded under some other form of audit
incentive policy."' This last provision was apparently added in an effort to
discourage the adoption of state audit privilege laws, as their application to a
disclosure would foreclose any opportunity for mitigation under the EPA's policy.
1. Penalty Mitigation
The cornerstone of the EPA's incentive policy involves the mitigation of gravitybased penalties. Other forms of financial penalties not covered in the policy are
relevant, however, to the disclosure of environmental audits. For instance, the EPA
has the power to recover through administrative penalties any sums which are
found to have been earned through noncompliance with environmental protection
laws." 9 Such a penalty ensures that regulated entities that fail to comply with
environmental statutes do not gain an economic advantage over the companies that
expend valuable resources in order to stay in compliance." The EPA loosely
refers to these penalties as designed to "level the playing field."'' In a critique
of the EPA's audit policy, one author states that regulated entities complain about
these fines because there is no way to predict how the EPA will quantify these
economic-balancing penalties.' " Specifically, industries are unsure how the EPA
decides what amount of their profit was earned as a result of noncompliance."
The EPA does use a system to determine the money a company may have earned
through violating the law. 4 However, the accuracy of this formula is questionable because it has never been evaluated by the public through the administrative rule-making process. Thus, despite the offer to alleviate some of the

116. Id. at 66,712.

117. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1041.
118. See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 30.

119. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,712.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See
Id.
See
See
See

id.
Campbell, supra note 5, at 1041.
id.
Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 32-34.
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financial burdens of enforcement, the threat of significant economic penalties still
remains. The EPA's failure to allow regulated entities to comment on the
procedure for cadculating these non-gravity-based penalties has left many
companies uncertin of how much they actually stand to lose by disclosing an
audit report. Thus, the offer of penalty mitigation provides limited incentives to
disclose an audit report.
2. Recommendationsfor Prosecution
Another loophole in the EPA's audit policy involves the agency's offer to refrain
from recommending a violating entity for prosecution. Much like the offer of
penalty mitigation, the EPA includes a reservation in its policy that cuts away at
the incentive to disclose audits in order to avoid suggestions for prosecution.
Specifically, the EPA retains the discretion to prosecute individuals within a
reporting entity fcr any violations disclosed even if the company itself was not
turned over to the DOJ for the commencement of an enforcement action." This
lack of protection for individuals who actually engage in the audit process may
render the results of a compliance inquiry meaningless, if an audit is performed at
all."z Due to the possibility of individual prosecutions, an auditor or manager
may be reluctant to perform the task required with any sort of depth, and may be
even more hesitant to report the actual results. 27
3. Requests for Audit Reports
The final incentive included in the EPA's audit policy is also subject to reservations of authority. Though the EPA states that it will refrain from requesting
frequent audit reports, in the hopes of triggering an enforcement action, it retains
the power to request audit reports "[i]f the agency has an independent reason to
believe that a violation has occurred."'" Thus, the offer to cut down on requests
for audits is illusory considering that the EPA does not provide a definition for the
term "independent reason." Though not likely, it is theoretically possible that under
the terms of the policy, the EPA could simply demand an audit report on the basis
that it heard a rumor of a violation. The threshold for what constitutes an independent reason is unclear from the language of the policy.
4. Lack of Confidentiality and the Possibilityfor Citizen Suits
The final policy statement makes no .guarantee regarding the confidentiality of
audit reports which are disclosed. Thus, even if the EPA and the DOJ decide not
to prosecute a violating entity, a third party could institute a civil suit against a
company based upon the information contained in an environmental audit. In fact,
a number of environmental statutes recommend civil suits in certain situations. 29

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.
See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1041.
See id.
60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711.
See Chaumette & Cason, supra note 18, at 31.
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Further, many courts see civil suits as an integral part of environmental
regulation.'
Consequently, many regulated entities have requested that the
results of their audit reports remain confidential, and thus, privileged from
discovery. Unfortunately, the EPA is unwilling to offer such an incentive. This
reluctance to grant privileged status for environmental audits reveals a fear that
such a privilege would interfere with the public's right to information regarding the
health of the environment. 3 '
Both environmental law and basic principles of discovery are based upon the
public's access to information regarding environmental threats. Without information, the public may lose faith in the EPA's ability to monitor environmental
compliance. In addition, the assertion of a privilege implies that there is something
to hide. Thus, the public may lose faith in the integrity of industry as well.
Finally, the courts frown upon the extension of confidentiality.," The United
States Supreme Court places significant emphasis on the freedom of discovery. In
U.S. v. Nixon,' the Court stated that evidentiary privileges "are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the truth."" For
these reasons and others, 3' the EPA will not extend confidentiality to environmental audits.
Considering the amount of discretion the EPA reserves in the application of the
benefits offered, it is easy to see why regulated entities assert that the final policy
statement leaves much to be desired. In the case of each benefit offered, the EPA
makes no guarantees that the policy will be followed. Further, the lack of
confidentiality for audit reports can expose companies to liabilities above and
beyond those imposed by the federal government. As a result, industries
nationwide have called out to their respective state legislatures for additional
protections.
IV. State Audit ProtectionLaws
Heeding the call from industries and other entities that fall under the regulatory
umbrella of federal environmental statutes and policies, many states have adopted
their own audit protection laws. Generally, these statutes augment the protections
offered by the EPA's final policy statement. By providing added incentives such
as confidentiality, immunity, and testimonial privileges, states seek to appease
regulated entities and encourage auditing by picking up where the EPA's policy
leaves off.

130. See id.
131. See Craig N. Johnson, An Essay on EnvironmentalAudit Privileges: The Right Problem, The
Wrong Solution, 25 ENvTL. L. 335, 342 (1995).
132. See id.
133. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
134. See Johnson, supra note 131, at 342 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974)).

135. See infratext accompanying notes 224-26 (discussing possible reasons for the Oklahoma DEQ's
refusal to offer a privilege for environmental audits).
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To date, at least nineteen states have enacted audit protection statutes, and many
others have laws pending in their legislatures."36 There are two general types of
statutes, based upon the protections offered. Most states provide either qualified
confidentiality for audit reports, qualified immunity from criminal and civil

prosecutions based on the information contained in an audit, or a combination of
the two.'37
Oklahoma has elected to adopt a variation of the state audit incentive statutes
in the form of an administrative rule. Administrative rules governing environmen-

tal audits offer the same types of incentives and protections as are offered by state
statutes. However, important procedural differences exist between an administrative rule and a state statute that may make the adoption of a rule more
attractive to state regulators than enactment of a law.
A. General Types of Statutes
One type of audit protection statute offers qualified confidential status for the
results of audit reports, but not qualified immunity from civil or criminal suits.
Oregon is an example of a state which has chosen to adopt a privilege-alone
statute and was the first state actually to codify an audit protection law. 3" Most
state laws are modeled after the Oregon statute.'39 For instance, Arkansas,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Utah all follow the Oregon model. Oregon's audit

136. The chart below is borrowed from Campbell, supra note 5, at 1030 n.6. The information in
the chart was gathered by the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hale and Dorr, LLP and is accurate as of
December 23, 1996.
State
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
New Hampshire
Ohio
Oregon
S. Carolina
S. Dakota
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Wyoming

Law/Bill
Effective Date
Act 350
7/28/65
Act 94-139
6/1/94
SB 1142
7/1/95
Pub. Act 88-0690
1/24/95
P.L. 16-1994,8
7/!/95
SE , 76
7/1/95
HB 681
7/15/95
SB 728
3/18/96
Statute § 115.B.03 6/1/95
Law § 49-2-51
7//95
HIB 275
7/1/95
SB 138
3/13/97
SR 912
11/4/93
H 3624
6/4/96
SB 24
7/1/96
HB 2473
5/23/95
§ 19-7-101
3/20/95
H11 1845
7/1/95
Act 26
7/1/95

137. See id.
138. See Grayson & Riewer, supra note 1, at 10,249.
139. See Scanlon, .upra note 14, at 651.
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protection statute grants privileged status to audit reports, exempting them from
disclosure. Two requirements must be met before the Oregon law will apply. First,
the audit disclosed must result from a voluntary inquiry."m4 Thus, after reading
the first requirement of the statute, a limitation to its application is readily
apparent. The statute will not protect any audit reports that are required to be
submitted under any federal or state environmental laws. 4' Because many state
and federal environmental laws require auditing, this requirement may substantially
limit the application of the Oregon law and is one of the main shortcomings
inherent in the many other statutes that have a like requirement. The second
requirement under Oregon's law is that companies take timely corrective steps in
order to remedy any harm to the environment caused by the violation reported. 42
One final limitation contained in the Oregon law prevents the application of the
statute when it is discovered that an audit was engaged in for fraudulent
purposes.143 This limitation is designed to ensure that companies do not conduct
an audit for the sole purpose of covering their tracks in the commission of an
intentional violation.
Another type of state audit protection law offers qualified confidentiality for
audit reports and provides immunity from prosecution based upon the information
disclosed in an audit report, or offers immunity alone, without confidentiality.
Essentially, this added provision of immunity allows a regulated entity to escape
penalties for violations revealed through an audit."' Colorado is one state that
has adopted an immunity provision in addition to confidentiality privileges."'
Under the Colorado audit law, voluntary environmental audits which promptly
disclose violations will receive confidential status and result in immunity from any
civil and administrative penalties and immunity from criminal penalties for any
negligent violations, provided the violations revealed are corrected in a timely
manner.' In defining what is a timely remediation, the Colorado statute requires
47
that any violations be corrected within two years of being reported.' In addition,
the statute mandates cooperation with authorities in their investigation of the
violation disclosed. 4 ' Other states that have adopted laws similar to the Colorado
statute include Michigan, Idaho, Texas, Kansas, New Hampshire, Minnesota, and

140. See OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963 (1997).
141. See id. § 468.963(5)(a).
142. See id. § 468.963(3)(d).
143. See id. § 468.963(3)(b)(A).
144. See Susan J. Spicer, Turning Environmental Litigation on its E.A.R.: The Effects of State
Initiatives EncouragingEnvironmental Audits, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (1997).
145. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(4) (1997) (providing immunity from civil and criminal
penalties when a violation is disclosed through a voluntary audit).
146. See id.
147. See id. § 25-1-114.5(1)(c).
148. See id. § 25-1-114.5(1)(d).
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South Dakota. 4 " Some states offer a variation of the Colorado immunity law by
providing an exemption from civil suits, but not from criminal prosecution.' °
B. Limitations on State Audit Protection Statutes
1. Requirement of Voluntariness
Most of the state audit protection laws require that the violation disclosed be the
product of a voluntary environmental audit."' Thus, these state statutes will
afford no protections for audits that are required to be disclosed under any state
or federal environmental law." Since many companies only perform audits in
order to stay in compliance with federal and state environmental laws, the
protections afforded by state statutes that require voluntary auditing may not apply.
This is especially true in light of the fact that federal and state regulatory agencies
have the power to expand the circumstances in which an audit is required by
law.' This power has at times been used intentionally to circumvent audit
protection statutes which are conditioned upon the voluntariness of the audit
disclosed." However, this requirement may have the effect of encouraging
regulated entities to engage in environmental audits with greater frequency in order
to produce reports outside of those required by statute.
2. Intentional Violations
Violations disclosed in an environmental audit that are found to be intentional
are not covered by any state's statutory protection. 55 Some state laws have
included criminal, grossly negligent, and reckless violations in their exemption
from application of statutory protections." Most state audit protection laws are
Thus, an intentional violation will not
designed only to shield negligent actors."
5
be eligible for protection in any state. 8
3. FraudulentAbuse of an Audit
As an extension of the prohibition against knowing violations, many state laws
also forbid regulated entities to use an audit to cover the tracks of an incident they

149. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.14809(1) (West Supp. 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
147-E:9 (Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338(a) (Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 1-40-33
(Michie Supp. 1998); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc, § 10 (West Supp. 1998).
150. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1199 (Michie Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-1729(7)(g), 49-17-43(g)(vii), 49-17-427(3)(g) (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106 (Michie 1997).
151. See, e.g., Coi.o. REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(1)(b) (1997) (outlining the prerequisites for a finding
of voluntariness, which is the main requirement for application of Colorado's audit incentives law); see
also, e.g., TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc, § 10(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1998).
152. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338(b) (Supp. 1997).
153. See Scanlon, supra note 14, at 655-56.
154. See id.
155. See Spicer, supra note 144, at 13.
156. See e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106(a)(iii) (Michie 1997).
157. See Spicer, supra note 144, at 13.
158. See id.
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know to be a violation. For example, Oregon's audit law exempts the application
of its confidentiality statute in situations in which an audit was engaged in for
fraudulent purposes.'59 In Colorado, a court may refuse to extend statutory
protections to an audit which is found to have been conducted for fraudulent
purposes."6 The Colorado statute elaborates on what is considered to be a
fraudulent purpose for conducting an audit. It states that audit reports created to
shield information from disclosure during imminent or ongoing agency enforcement actions or civil suits are performed as an evasive tactic rather than as an
attempt at voluntary compliance. 6' Thus, companies are prevented from
committing intentional violations and abusing the audit protection statutes by
performing an audit solely to circumvent environmental protection laws.
4. Exemptions for Duplicate Violations
Most state audit protection statutes exclude application where a disclosed
violation evidences a pattern of past discrepancies or repeated violations of
environmental laws. Such provisions ensure that state audit protection laws are not
used to shield the conduct of so-called "bad actors"" - regulated entities that
would use the audit protection statutes as a means to facilitate the intentional
violation of environmental laws. States may differ in the frequency with which
duplicate or similar violations are allowed before an exclusion from benefits is
triggered. In South Dakota, for example, a violation similar to the one currently
exposed must not have occurred within the last two years."6 In New Jersey,
however, a similar violation of the same permit or at the same facility must not
have occurred within a year of a previously reported infraction." Thus, in almost
all states, the protections offered in an audit privilege or immunity statute will not
apply if a similar violation has been reported within a specific period of time.
Considering the vast number of environmental regulations that are in force and the
difficulty of maintaining compliance with all of them, it is easy to imagine the
existence of repeated violations, especially at the same facility. This exception
does not necessarily swallow the rule, but it does leave state regulators with a
greater opportunity to exercise their discretion not to apply the protections offered.
5.Exemption for Violations Causing SubstantialEnvironmental Harm
Many state audit protection statutes are inapplicable where the violation reported
results in serious harm to human or environmental health and safety."tr Mississippi is one state that adopted a significant damage exemption in its audit privilege
and immunity statute." Arguably, almost any violation reported will result in
159. See OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(b)(A) (Supp. 1996).

160. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(d) (1997).

161. See id.
162. See Spicer, supra note 144, at 14.
163. See S.D. CODIFIED LAvs § 1-40-36(2) (Michie 1998).
164. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-129(b)(5)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1998).
165. See, e.g., UTAH R. EVID. 508(d)(4) (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25126.5(3)(e) (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(ii)(D) (Michie 1997).
166. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7)(g)(vi), 49-17-43(g)(vii)(6), 49-17-427(3)(g)(vi) (1995
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some damage to the environment. Under many of these statutes, however, when
such damage becomes "significant" is unclear. For example, regulators may not
feel that a chemical release was substantial enough to threaten human safety.
However, it may result in the death of wildlife or the impairment of aesthetic
values. Thus, by including such a provision in an audit incentive statute, states
have reserved broad discretion in the decision of whether to apply their audit
protection laws based on the nature and severity of the damage caused by the
violation reported
6. Waiver
Many state audit privilege statutes allow waiver of the protections under certain
circumstances. Some state laws indicate that privileges may be waived by
implication. 67 However, the circumstances which result in an implied waiver are
not always spelled out in the statutes. Thus, the implied waiver of confidentiality
privileges may present state authorities with yet another opportunity to exercise
their discretion and deny the protections offered in their audit protection statutes.
The disclosure of confidential information to a third party constitutes the most
common means by which a privilege can be impliedly waived."M The rationale
behind this policy stems from the fact that the voluntary disclosure of privileged
information to a third party evidences a diminished expectation of privacy in the
information revealed." Since many environmental audits are conducted with the
help of outside consultants, statutes that allow waiver through disclosure to third
parties create a significant possibility that an audit privilege law will not apply.
-Questions also arise as to the result, under principles of waiver, of the disclosure
of audit information to regulatory agencies, especially if the information in
question does not qualify for the privilege offered by the statute. Under Wyoming
law, the audit statute seems to suggest that disclosure of audit information to
government agencies waives the privilege.' Outside the realm of environmental
audits, some courts have held that the communication of confidential information
to the government constitutes a waiver of any privilege for the information
disclosed in future actions.' In states that allow an implied waiver of privileges,
such a rule presents a discouraging possibility regarding the application of state
audit privilege laws. Alternatively, some state statutes require that a waiver must

& Supp. 1998).
167. See, e.g., [ND, CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-7(a) (Michie 1996); see also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-111105(c)(i) (Michie 1997) (stating that the privilege is waived if audit information is introduced in any
part of any proceeding, including the reporting of violations as required by statute).
168. See Spicer, supra note 144, at 27.
169. See id.
170. See WYo. STAT.-ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(i) (Michie 1997).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the voluntary
communication of information to the government pursuant to an investigation for violations of RICO
resulted in an implied waiver of privileged status for the information).
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be expressed. For example, Arkansas' audit privilege law states that a waiver of
confidentiality may only be accomplished expressly."
7. Exception Upon Showing of Compelling Need
By demonstrating that a substantial need exists for the information contained in
an audit report, a party bringing suit may induce the court to waive the qualified
immunity offered by a state audit protection statute. For example, Colorado's
statute provides that audit reports may be subject to discovery following a
determination by the court that compelling circumstances exist." Unfortunately,
the Colorado statute fails to establish the definition and scope of the exception for
"compelling circumstances." Thus, broad discretion is retained by regulators and
the courts in deciding whether to accord privileged status to an environmental audit
report. Other statutes indicate that "compelling circumstances" may be shown
based upon evidence that a substantial need exists and the information requested
is unavailable from any other source."
Thus, much is left to be desired by the protections these laws offer. There are
many loopholes in the statutes which allow the states to revoke any privileges and
deny immunity. Even though the protections offered present a potentially
significant barrier to the enforcement of state and federal environmental
regulations, states have reserved considerable discretion not to apply privilege and
immunity statutes. Therefore, the protections contained in state environmental audit
statutes may be illusory.
8. Alternative Enforcement Methods
Despite the application of a state's audit privilege or immunity statute, regulatory
agencies still have the power to reach violators through the use of alternative
theories of recovery. Many state laws expressly or impliedly establish the right to
seek remediation of violations reported, even though the information that disclosed
a violation may have become privileged or the entity reporting the violation may
have become immune from an enforcement action or civil suit. In an action for
remediation, a regulated entity may be required to pay for damages to the environment and even reimbursement for the state's costs in bringing the remediation
suit.' Thus, means are available to force a company to pay for its violations,
even if it is granted immunity by an audit protection statute.
VI. Oklahoma's Policy Regarding Incentives for Environmental Auditing
As a result of the shortcomings found in state statutes protecting environmental
audits and for other reasons, Oklahoma takes a different route in providing incentives
for the performance and disclosure of environmental audits. Instead of enacting a

172. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304(a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
173. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(c) (1997).
174. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-3(a)(2)(D) (Michie 1996).
175. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-29(7)(g), 49-17-43(g)(vii), 49-17-427(3)(g) (1995 &
Supp. 1998).
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formal state statute, Oklahoma recently adopted a state environmental regulatory
agency policy regarding incentives to promote environmental auditing.'76 There are
distinct differences between an agency policy and a state statute in terms of
administration and enforcement. Some of these differences make the adoption of a
policy more attractive than the creation of a state statute.
A. Regulatory Background: The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ)
As discussed in the preamble of Oklahoma's environmental audit incentives rule,
the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) "monitors the environmental
compliance of regulated entities" in Oklahoma." The duties and powers of the
DEQ are defined in its organic statute. 79 One of the duties enumerated is to act as
the official agency of Oklahoma to cooperate with federal agencies in the enforcement of pollution control laws.' Among its various powers, the DEQ has the
authority to determine and assess administrative penalties.'" In addition, the DEQ
has the power to investigate violations of environmental regulations, recommend civil
and criminal prosecutions, review records, and conduct hearings.'i The DEQ's
power to mandate environmental auditing stems from its authority to "require the
maintenance of records and reports and the installation, use, and maintenance of
monitoring equipment or methods and the provision of such information to the
Department upon request.""
B. Analysis of the Policy
Similar to some state environmental audit immunity statutes, Oklahoma's
administrative rule is designed to provide incentives to establish a system of selfmonitoring through the performance of internal audits followed by a reporting of the
results to management and regulators.' The incentives proposed in the rule include
mitigation of administrative and civil penalties for voluntary reports of noncompliance.' Such a system encourages regulated entities to play a substantial role
in ensuring their compliance with environmental regulations rather than relying on
the DEQ to force compliance through inspections, enforcement actions, and
penalties."
The rationale behind the rule is that self-auditing should be promoted because
regulated entities have a "superior vantage point" to observe and monitor compliance

176. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7 (1997) (dealing with "Administrative Penalty
Proceedings" and "Considerations for Self-Reporting of Noncompliance").
177. Id. § 252:2-11-7(a).
178. See 27A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2-3-101 (West Supp. 1997).
179. See id.
180. See id. § 2-3-202.
181. See id.
182. See id. § 2-3-202(8).
183. See OKLA. ADIIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7 (1997) (outlining the DEQ's audit incentives policy).
184. See id.
185. See id.
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and also have more resources at their disposal to ensure that environmental
regulations are followed." Thus, the DEQ asserts that the regulated entities must
play the primary role in ensuring their compliance with environmental laws and
protecting the environment.'87 This concept is especially true considering the
decrease in funding available for regulatory enforcement at federal and state
levels." In addition to helping regulators, the DEQ points out that adherence to the
rule will enable regulated entities to concentrate their resources on ensuring
compliance rather than on paying penalties."
Though the rule offers to mitigate penalties, the drafters of the DEQ rule maintain
that administrative and civil sanctions still serve an important function in the
enforcement process.' Even though the role of economic penalties in ensuring
enforcement is not as central as it once was, administrative fines are still necessary
as a primary incentive for the performance of environmental audits and the
monitoring of compliance with environmental laws. Without regulatory prodding
through penalties, the free market provides little incentive to cover the spillover costs
associated with environmental harm. The effects of environmental damage are for the
most part indirect and, if not malum prohibitum, are simply viewed as just another
cost of doing business that can be avoided. 9' Thus, the DEQ does not offer to
eradicate completely the use of penalties, rather only to mitigate them where
appropriate. The DEQ offers penalty mitigation in cases in which a regulated entity
discloses a violation, takes timely remedial action, and employs measures to prevent
recurrence of the problem or similar violations in the future."
The DEQ outlines several specific factors that the agency will consider in deciding
whether to seek administrative or civil penalties against a regulated entity that
voluntarily reports a violation of environmental regulations.' These requirements
for the application of the rule are very similar to the factors listed in many if not all
other state statutes or regulations designed to provide incentives for environmental
auditing.'" First, the disclosure must be voluntary, complete, and in writing before
the DEQ is aware of the problem or is likely to become aware through pending
investigation. Second, the violation cannot be intentional. Third, the problem
reported cannot evidence a lack of good faith in the attempt to comply with environmental regulations. Evidence of bad faith can be found in the failure to use an

186. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7(a) (1997).
187. See id. § 252:2-11-7 (setting forth the reasoning behind the DEQ's desire to increase regulated
entities' involvement in ensuring compliance with environmental laws).
188. See Campbell, supra note 5.
189. See Oklahoma Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Board Briefing Paper, Title 252: DEQ, Chapter 2:
Procedures of the DEQ, Permanent Rulemaking, Executive Summary I (n.d.) (on file with the Oklahoma
Law Review).
190. See id.
191. See WILLIAM F. FUNK Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE

15 (1997)

(discussing the reasons that administrative regulations are necessary for ensuring the coverage of spillover costs in an unregulated market).
192. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7(b) (1997).

193. See id.
194. See, e.g., EPA's Final Policy Statement, supra note 29.
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"environmental management system" designed to meet the specific needs of the entity
in question. Fourth, the reporting entity must have taken timely steps toward
remediation. Fifth, measures must be employed, or the reporting party must agree in
writing to employ, corrective actions which will prevent the recurrence of the
violation or similar problems in the future. Sixth, any damage to the environment as
a result of the violation must be corrected, if not already remedied. Seventh, the
regulated entity must not have received any economic or competitive advantages as
a result of its noncompliance. Finally, the reporting entity must cooperate with the
DEQ in the investigation of the problem disclosed and in its remediation."s
Even if a regulated entity fails to meet all of the required conditions for mitigation
of penalties, the DEQ will take into consideration the nature and extent of any efforts
by the reporting party to comply with the policy in deciding whether and to what
extent to penalize a violator." Further, part [c] of the policy states that in the event
a regulated entity meets all the requirements except number seven, dealing with
economic gains as a result of noncompliance, the DEQ will limit its penalty to the
recovery of those economic gains only." 7 It is clear that the DEQ's intent is to
provide incentives to audit and to further the goals of environmental protection rather
than to punish violators. This is evidenced by the DEQ's willingness to offer penalty
mitigation despite a failure to meet all the conditions required by the auditing policy.
However, the last clause of the policy states that any mitigation of penalties offered
by the DEQ is subject to agreements between the DEQ and the EPA.9 ' Oklahoma's
policy thus offers no guarantee that the benefits for disclosing an audit will apply.
Therefore, Oklahoma's policy is subject to the same limitation to which most other
state audit protection statutes fall prey: the ultimate discretion of the EPA.
C. Operation of the DEQ Policy in Conjunction with the EPA's FinalPolicy
Statement
The two rules are very similar in the protections offered and in the conditions
required. The DEQ policy's prerequisites are almost identical to the EPA's. In
addition, both offer only qualified immunity from penalties and no privilege for
voluntary audit reports. In fact, the DEQ's rule was considered as a model for the
formulation for the EPA's final policy statement. A proposed version of the DEQ
policy was submitted prior to the formulation of the EPA's final policy statement
during the administrative comment period.'" The proposed draft of the DEQ policy
submitted during the comment period strongly resembles the final version of the
DEQ policy. Judging by the similarities of the DEQ and EPA policies, the Oklahoma
policy may have provided the EPA with a working model of the type of policy the
federal government would ultimately adopt. Thus, the DEQ policy may have played
195. See supra note 192 (outlining the conditions or the application of the DEQ's audit incentives
policy).
196. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7(c) (1997).
197. See id.
198. See id. § 252:2-11 -7(d).
199. See Gerald B. Davenport, Proposed Policy on Self-Reported Violations, Oklahoma Department
of Environmental Quality, (Sept. 8, 1994) (EPA Enforcement & Compliance Docket C-94-01 / 11-C-12).
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a significant role in the formulation of the federal policy on incentives for
environmental auditing.
Though the DEQ's rule cannot guarantee the EPA will not overturn its decisions
to mitigate penalties, two factors indicate that it is unlikely the EPA would override
any decision by the DEQ to mitigate penalties. First, the two policies are so similar.
Second, the role the DEQ policy played in the establishment of EPA's policy and the
existence of a positive working relationship between the DEQ and the EPA imply
that deference will be afforded to the decisions of the DEQ. To reinforce this notion,
Oklahoma's rule can be compared to a recent policy statement by the EPA.
The EPA policy sets out a number of factors it will consider in determining
whether a state audit privilege and/or immunity statute contravenes federal authority
to regulate the environment and prevents states from doing the job which the
government has delegated the power to do."' First, the EPA requires that states
retain the ability to obtain an injunction against violators, regardless of whether a
violation was reported through an environmental audit. The Oklahoma policy does
not hinder the issuing of injunctions for violations. It only mitigates penalties. It does
not completely eradicate them. Second, states must have the power to levy economic
penalties against violators in order to level the economic playing field so that no
party can benefit from a violation. The DEQ rule offers to mitigate only gravitybased penalties, not remedial penalties. Third, states must have the ability to gather
information necessary for criminal investigations and prosecutions. The DEQ requires
that companies cooperate with the investigating agency for the protections of the rule
to apply.2 Finally, state audit protection laws must not interfere with the public's
access to information regarding environmental violations.' 3 The DEQ policy
affords no privilege for the information contained in an audit that would block the
public's access to information regarding violations. Therefore, although the DEQ rule
offers no guarantees, deference to its decisions is highly likely since the rule is
almost identical to the EPA's policy and complies with the recently issued minimum
requirements for a state audit incentive rule or law.
D. Choosing Administrative Rules Over State Statutes To Provide Incentives to
Audit
As evidenced by statements made in the EPA's final policy statement, the EPA
strongly opposes state audit protection laws which offer incentives such as a qualified
privilege.' With this in mind, Oklahoma and other states have opted to avoid

200. See Oklahoma Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Summary of Comments and Responses to DEQ's
Proposed Audit Policy at 252:2-11-7, cmt. 3, response 2 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter DEQ Summary of
Comments & Responses] (stating that there is a good working relationship between the EPA and the
DEQ such that EPA will rarely override decisions of the DEQ regarding the mitigation of penalties).
201. See Barry Shanoff, Self-Audits InspireLeniency from States, WORLD WASTES, May 1, 1997,
at 16, available in 1997 WL 10233592.
202. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252:2-11-7(b)(8) (1997).
203. See id.
204. See 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706,66,710 (1995) (outlining the reasons for the EPA's opposition to audit
privilege laws).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:541

increased federal scrutiny by adopting administrative policies for audit protection that
resemble the federal policy rather than enacting state statutes that offer incentives
besides penalty mitigation. By doing so, Oklahoma and other states that follow the
EPA's lead may avoid offending the EPA with state laws that appear to federal
regulators as an abuse of federally delegated power to regulate the environment.
Therefore, Oklahoma avoids the risk of having its power to regulate the environment
revoked because of an audit statute that runs contrary to the goals of the EPA. "5
In addition to notions of not biting the hand that feeds, several procedural reasons
exist for why a state regulatory agency would choose to adopt an administrative
policy rather than seek the enactment of a state law. First, agency policies have the
binding effect of law,' but may be adopted and changed through quicker and more
efficient processes than those required for the creation of a state statute.2w Second,
enacting a policy rather than a state law affords the agency enforcing the rule greater
flexibility in carrying out its regulatory mission. This flexibility arises because an
agency's interpretation of its own rule enjoys great deference." Such deference
may not otherwise be available in the case of the interpretation and enforcement of
laws adopted by the state. For instance, an agency may refuse to take action in the
enforcement of one of its rules without incurring any judicial scrutiny."m In the case
of environmental audit incentive policies, such discretion can work to the advantage
of regulated entities that choose to comply with the rules. On the other hand, an
agency's decisions of whether and to what extent to enforce state laws may be
beyond the agency's discretion. Agency rules allow flexibility in enforcement. This
flexibility results in a savings of scarce regulatory resources.
Besides the regulatory discretion, the third reason that agencies may prefer to adopt
their own rules is because the procedures required in the enactment of administrative
rules supply the agency with valuable information. Under section 553 of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act,"'0 agencies are required to provide the public with
general notice of a proposed rule and must afford interested parties the opportunity
to comment on the proposed rules.' This procedure allows the agency to hear

205. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Battle Lines Form Over Environmental Disclosure Laws, J. REC.
(Oklahoma City), Apr. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11095517 (stating that President Clinton has

warned states that if they go too far in providing protections for environmental audits, the administration
will "withhold the authority that is commonly delegated to states to enforce federal laws").
206. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 191, at 18.
207. For example, ag;ency policies require no procedures except publication in the federal register;

not even informal rule-making procedures such as notice and comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
208. See FUNK Er AL., supra note 191, at 139 (recounting Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (stating that in the absence of a clear inconsistency with the statute.
an agency's interpretation need only meet the standard of reasonableness)).
209. See id. at 431 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (stating there are "several
occasions... [where] an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision committed to an agency's absolute discretion")). The Court in Chancy reasoned
that agencies should be able to decide how their limited resources are spent in order to facilitate the
pursuit of their statutory mandate. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 83 1.
210. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
211. See id § 553; see also Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act, 75 OKLA. STAT. § 303(A)
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interested parties' opinions and suggestions regarding the proposed rule, thus
facilitating the adoption of a policy that most people can live with and avoiding
problems in the future. "[U]tilizing rulemaking procedures opens up the process of
agency policy innovation to a broad range of criticism, advice, and data that is
ordinarily less likely to be forthcoming ... ,,
E. Adequacy of the DEQ Rule from the Perspective of the Regulated
Following its notice of the proposed rule, the DEQ summarized the comments it
received regarding the audit incentives policy." 3 Most of the input from the parties
that submitted a comment was positive. For instance, a comment submitted from the
Environmental Foundation began by applauding the DEQ for its reduction of the selfreporting policy to writing.' 4 Even Coors Brewing Company, an entity well aware
of the dangers inherent in reporting violations, stated that a policy such as the DEQ's
is a "positive step forward toward encouraging the voluntary disclosure of
environmental violations."" 5 Coors went on to say that it "heartily supports
Oklahoma's assessment of the need to provide relief from civil penalties for selfreported violations."2 6
Despite the positive input provided by most of the comments, suggestions for
change were also submitted. For instance, Mobil Exploration and Producing U.S.
(MEPUS) articulated its concern that certain revisions should have been included in
the rule to prevent Oklahoma from being placed at a disadvantage relative to other
states regarding its ability to attract industry." 7 Specifically, MEPUS recommended
that the DEQ clarify how it will decide when a company has gained a "significant
economic or competitive advantage as a result of non-compliance."" 8 In response
to this suggestion, the DEQ stated that it thought the language regarding economic
advantage is sufficiently clear but that it can be clarified as needed on a case-by-case
basis. 9 In addition, MEPUS stated that the DEQ must provide a means of assuring
regulated entities that a decision by the DEQ to mitigate penalties will not be
overridden by the EPA. The DEQ responded to this recommendation by stating
that while it cannot guarantee that the EPA will not overturn the decisions of the
DEQ, such a reversal will be rare due to the positive working relationship between
the EPA and the DEQ'

(Supp. 1995).
212. FUNK ET AL., supra note 191, at 306 (quoting National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
213. See DEQ Summary of Comments & Responses, supra note 200.
214. See id. at cmt. 1.
215. Id. at cmt. 4.
216. Id.
217. See id. at cmt. 3.
218. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 252-I 1-7(b)(7) (1997) (quoting the language of the DEQ's policy).
219. See DEQ Summary of Comments & Responses, supra note 200, at cmt. 3.
220. See id.
221. See id.
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Coors Brewing Company submitted suggestions for change in conjunction with its
favorable comments regarding the DEQ rule. Coors called for an increase in the
protections offered by the rule. Specifically, Coors recommended that the DEQ
provide a qualified privilege for environmental audit reports disclosed pursuant to the
rule.' In response, the DEQ stated that such a privilege is unnecessary because
regulated entities will have sufficient incentive to perform audits under the
protections already offered.'
F. Reasons for the DEQ's Failure to Offer a Qualified Privilegefor Audits
Besides the response to the Coors comment given by the DEQ, there are several
other possible reasons that the agency may have opted not to offer privileged status
as an incentive to perform environmental audits. First, it can be argued that audit
privilege laws foster an unrealistic and irresponsible notion that companies can avoid
liability for their improper actions simply by keeping them a secret. Civil and
administrative enforcement actions are the only way to ensure that regulated entities
take responsibility for actions that negatively impact the environment. If the
information contained in an environmental audit is elevated to the level of privileged
status, enforcement actions related to the information reported in an audit become
almost impossible because the information in question cannot be accessed. The object
of environmental audit incentive laws is to encourage companies to perform audits
in order to further the goal of environmental health and safety through a monitoring
of compliance with environmental laws. If audit incentive laws provide regulated
entities with a means of skirting responsibility for their actions by allowing them to
avoid enforcement suits, then the benefits offered in the policy defeat the purposes
for which the policy was established. Further, when regulators offer to mitigate the
penalties imposed by civil or administrative enforcement actions, companies have
little to fear by going to court. Once punitive penalties are mitigated, all an
enforcement suit will require of a company is that it take responsibility for remedying
the damage it caused to the environment. By allowing regulated entities to evade
enforcement suits, evidentiary privileges may enable companies to avoid cleaning up
their own messes, and thereby to dodge one of the most elementary notions of
responsibility.
Preemption is the second reason that the DEQ may have decided not to offer a
qualified privilege for audit materials. Most federal and state environmental
protection statutes require prosecution of violators of the statutory provisions.
Because evidentiary privileges seriously inhibit regulators and the public from
engaging in enforcement actions, the privilege may prevent the implementation of
federal law. When the application of a state law conflicts with the enforcement of
federal statutes, the Supremacy Clause provides that state statutes must yield to
federal law.' The United States Supreme Court has found that a state law that
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

222. See id. at emt. 4.
223. See id.
224. See U.S. CONSr. art. VI, cf. 2.
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objectives of Congress" is in actual conflict with federal law and is thus
preempted. By shielding violators from enforcement actions, audit privilege laws
may defeat the congressional goals behind environmental regulations. Therefore, state
laws that contain such privileges may be found to be inapplicable due to federal
preemption.
A third reason that may have influenced the DEQ not to offer a qualified privilege
is that such provisions often contain many limitations in order to avoid abuse by
regulated entities and also to prevent the exceptions from swallowing the rule. Thus,
a privilege provision is often an ineffective protection and is therefore unnecessary.
An examination of a typical audit privilege provision illustrates the limitations that
render such protections meaningless. Louisiana has chosen to adopt an audit privilege
law.' Considering just the sheer number of exceptions provided, it is easy to see
why the DEQ may have been hesitant to offer a qualified privilege as an incentive

225. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
226. See H.B. 2085, 1995 Leg. Sess. (La.). Section 2514 of the Louisiana law outlines the
circumstances in which the self-evaluation privilege will not apply. First, information or materials
gathered pursuant to a permit or an order are exempt from the privilege. Second, information or
documents required to be reported under an environmental law fall outside the privilege. Third, any
information that a regulatory agency gathers on its own is not subject to the privilege. Fourth, the
privilege will not be extended to any information received through an independent source, notwithstanding its inclusion in an audit report. Fifth, any records compiled independent of or before an audit is
performed are also exempt from the privilege. Sixth, any information gathered independently of an audit
or following its completion is discoverable. Seventh, factual information contained in an audit report,
revealed by a person who played a part in the performance of the audit and who has actual knowledge
of the events that constitute the violation in question are admissible in court. It is not inconceivable to
imagine an auditor, or any other personnel assisting in the performance of an audit, revealing the
information he gathered, for any number of reasons. This may be especially true if the violation
catalogued in the audit has resulted in severe damage to human or environmental health. Eighth, the
actual existence of the audit report is discoverable, along with the subject matter of its contents, the dates
it was conducted, and the names of the persons who performed the audit. Once the existence of an audit
is revealed, along with the subject matter of the violation it contains, the interest of third parties may be
sparked. If an independent source is then able to gather information about the audit in question, the
materials obtained by the third party will be exempt from the privilege under the fourth and sixth
exceptions mentioned above.
In addition to the aforementioned exceptions to the application of Louisianas audit privilege statute,
section 2513 of the bill provides another list of circumstances in which the privilege will not apply. First,
the privilege is inapplicable where it has been waived by the auditing party. Second, upon a finding that
the audit report evidences noncompliance and a failure to take steps to remedy the violation within thirty
days, an administrative law judge (ALJ) may refuse the application of the privilege. Third, the privilege
will not apply where a court finds that the audit report is being compiled for fraudulent purposes. Fourth,
where an AU finds that the report is being used to cloak a violation from disclosure in a pending
administrative or civil proceeding, the privilege is inapplicable. Fifth, the privilege will be waived where
it is determined that the violation reported constitutes a significant threat to human or environmental
health and safety. The bill fails to define the term "significant," leaving broad discretion to regulators
in determination of the gravity of the violation reported. Finally, any third party possessing independent
knowledge that one of the thirteen exceptions applies may gain access to the audit report in order to
observe under an in camera review. In light of this final exception, it is conceivable that a third party
could gain access to the audit report, learn of its contents, and then apply the fourth exception of section
2514, dealing with independent sources, to relay the contents of the audit to regulators, thereby
exempting the information reported from the protection of the privilege.
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for auditing. As the DEQ stated in its response to Coors' comment recommending
such a privilege, the protections offered under the current rule are sufficient to
perform the task the law was designed to achieve: providing regulated entities with
an incentive to perfbrm environmental audits. In addition, regulated entities may rely
on the limited privileges provided by traditional legal doctrines such as the attorneyclient privilege and work product doctrine. Though these privileges have their
limitations, they an. still effective, especially in conjunction with the benefits offered
in an auditing incentives policy such as the one adopted by the DEQ.
Regulated entitics have a legitimate interest in avoiding being haled into court as
a result of a voluntary audit. However, there is little to fear when companies can rely
on a mitigation of any punitive administrative or civil penalties, as offered in
exchange for compliance with the Oklahoma rule. At most, regulated entities may
be held accountable for the damage they caused and for any advantages they may
have realized as a result of their noncompliance. Companies that complain about this
sort of liability could stand to pay a visit to a local kindergarten. While in
attendance, there are a few simple rules that we all learn to follow: clean up your
mess and return what does not belong to you.
VII. Conclusion
Due to the possibility of penalization, the importance of environmental laws has
become clear to most regulated entities. Environmental threats are serious, and
regulations to protect the health of our surroundings are necessary. Numerous
arguments circulate in the media that explain away almost every environmental
problem of which we are aware today. However, any doubts regarding the reality of
environmental threats can be dispensed with easily by reference to the sheer number
of environmental :.egulations contained in the endless volumes of the Federal
Register. The government obviously takes environmental health and very safety
seriously. It expends millions of dollars each year in the formulation of environmental laws and the support of regulatory agencies that enforce them. Rarely in the
history of policy making has the federal government established such a multitude of
antecedent safeguards to defend against a threat, the existence of which the public
is not yet entirely convinced.
In the most maternalistic sense, environmental regulations punish in order to
protect us from our,;elves. If people really knew the harm they inflict on themselves
by damaging the environment that supports them, they would be more cautious.
Despite a history of ambivalence, some awareness of the importance of environmental protection on the part of regulated entities has clearly blossomed. Voluntary
environmental audits illustrate such awareness. Command and control regulation,
focusing on punishment, is not necessary. Environmental audit incentive policies like
Oklahoma's strongly encourage self-monitoring by the regulated community.
Oklahoma's audit incentives policy provides incentives to audit without compromising
the goals of federal regulations established to ensure environmental protection. Thus,
the DEQ's policy will perform the tasks it was designed to accomplish.
PatrickDecker Sachse
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